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“Whatever happens with historical human
beings comes in each case from a decision
about the essence of truth that happened 
long ago and is never up to humans alone.”
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Abstract: This study, related to Plato’s cave-myth, attempts to open up
the meaning and existential importance of the essence of truth by focusing
on the interdependence of liberty and truth. It points out that the essence
of truth is liberty and vice versa, the essence of liberty is truth, for without
the liberty and openness of search there can be no (artistic, scientific or
1 Martin  Heidegger,  Plato’ Doctrine  of  Truth.  English  translation  by  Thomas
Sheehan, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, Cambridge, UK,
and  New York,  Cambridge  University  Press,  1998 p.  182. (The  motto  in  the
Hungarian  version  of  this  study was  taken from the following  edition:  Martin
Heidegger, “Platón tanítása az igazság lényegéről”, in idem., Útjelzők, Budapest,
Osiris, 2003, p. 224.) 
2 József Hajós, “Ötlések” (Ideas), in Színkép – A Romániai Magyar Szó Melléklete
(Spectrum –  The  Supplement  of  the  “Hungarian  Word  of  Romania”),  28–29th
June, 2003, p. A.
philosophical)  truth  at  all.  Far  from  giving  a  final  definition  of  this
relationship,  the paper illustrates the way in which these two essential
components of human life constantly refer to, question and open up one
another, showing that, according to the Heideggerian motto:  “Whatever
happens with historical human beings comes in each case from a decision




One may wonder why is it  that we, human beings are always
inclined or even “compelled” to think about and grasp notions like truth,
good,  beauty  etc.  only  in  contrast  with  their  conceptual  counterparts:
untruth, evil, ugliness etc. These conceptual opposites constantly refer to
one another, and eventually they prove to  be continuously interlinked,
each notion of these pairs indispensably requiring its counterpart.
The  question  asked  above  does  neither  refer  to  how  the
mentioned oppositions are divided for example in a “proper” or a “non-
proper”  way…  nor  does  it  try  to  find  or  discover  a  way  to  surpass
somehow “dialectically”  the  polarities.  The  question’s aim is  to  make
understandable  the  interdependence  of  the  opposites  as  opposites,  and
above all to throw light on the ontological source where we may possibly
find their origin too.
Therefore those roots would be interesting, from which and from
where springs the intermediarity – and not the commonness, commonality
– of the opposites: truth and falsity, truth and untruth; opposites which
belong together, moreover are interdependent. These roots later on decide
the counterparts’ historical fate.
But this source, of course,  is probably deeper and beyond any
kind of “theory of science”, epistemology or logical formalism. For, as
Martin Heidegger formulates as well: such a question actually refers to
the essence of truth.
According to the “title” these fragmentary sentences would treat
however “liberty”  as well as “truth”, wouldn’t they? Moreover the title
states the relationship “between” them with an “and”, that is, exactly as
“and”. But what does really mean – first of all and actually – to treat/to
think about “liberty”? And, likewise, what does it mean at all – again first
of all or in the first place – to regard “truth”?
However, if we really consider all these questions – as questions!
–,  we may immediately find out  that  to  think about  “liberty”  actually
means to investigate – for its own possibilities – the “truth” related to it,
respectively, together with and by this investigation to operate “truth” in a
very essential sense!
And if we have considered this as well,  then it may probably
occur that we cannot in fact “treat” truth otherwise than as the operation
and  “assertion”  of  liberty  itself;  operation  and  assertion  divided  in  a
determined way and very much asserted!
In  this way it  may strike the eye  from the beginning that  the
“and” present  in  the main title  is  not a  simple “conjunction”  – which
therefore would “serve” for connecting some notions “with” it1 –; on the
contrary:  it  is  the  problematising-thematising  connecting-name  of  the
interconnected intercommunication of liberty and truth.
Therefore, according to all these, “Liberty and Truth” in the title
tells that liberty and truth belonging to one another do belong historically
to our own selves or our existence – and through this – to existence in
general too, as specifically our own existential possibilities, as question,
respectively as provoking difficulty.
According  to  these:  we  would  belong  to  our  (existential)
possibilities as belonging to ourselves in the expressed question/case of
liberty and truth; we would belong to existence – and existence to us as
well  –  placed  into  these  notions  and   “contained”  by  them  in  an
accentuated and questioning way…
We have  heard  for  a  long  time  and  frequently:  truth  is  the
benefactor  and  ally  of  liberty.  It  is  also  frequently  said  that,  on  the
contrary, being in the possession of truth often ensures the domination
over  others…  And  also  that:  truth  exactly  liberates!  It  may  not  be
accidental  that  nowadays  the  renamed  and “operationalised”  collective
name of liberty(s) is “justice”2…
We  obviously  often  hear  that:  neither  liberty  is  boundless
arbitrariness,  nor  truth  is  absolute  or  everlasting…  That  is,  liberty  is
delimited by non-liberty or the sham-liberty of arbitrariness and truth is
1 Say: we connect – and this actually always remains an external connection – a
problem  of  “speciality”  (liberty),  belonging  to  the  domains  of  “political
philosophy”,  “moral  philosophy”,  or  “philosophy  of  law”,  with  another
“speciality” problem (truth), this time an “epistemological” one. 
2 There is here a pun that cannot be rendered in English. In Hungarian “justice” is
derived from the same stem as “truth”.
delimited  by  untruth,  falsehood  and  the  historicity  of  truth.  In  other
words: these make the two notions “relative”.
Truth and liberty bear – usually with a reconciled dejection – the
not quite meaningful attribute of relativity rather in relation to themselves,
their own imperfection and not in relation with one another. Consequently
they relate to – more precisely they are compared to – one another as
being “relative”; obviously this relationship is “relative” as well…
Therefore when, all of a sudden, Heidegger thought of showing
the essence of truth as being expressly and definitely in liberty, in the
essence of liberty, this has not really caused an uproar.1 For, between the
many relative things everything always finds its similarly relative place
shortly and easily. That is to say: it gets lost.
It  is  therefore  a  question,  whether  truth  and  liberty  can  be
defined  at  all  as  relation(s)/relationship(s),  respectively  attribute-like
state(s), or they rather are – in a more profound sense – the existence-like
divisions of belonging to one another, respectively of belonging to (the)
existence.
2.
The  tale  of  Plato’s  allegory  of  the  cave  is  about  education,
according to its main theme, or, to be more precise, about the  paideia.2
Meanwhile and to the same extent the myth is about truth as well, and, as
it can be proved, about liberty, too...
For here education is outlined as the “art of bending the soul”,
which – captivating the entire soul – orientates the abilities and “organ”
present in everyone’s mind towards the Idea of Good. By this it makes
able for the soul to contemplate the being and the being’s brightest core,
moreover to reside perseveringly at this core from now on.
However, the paideia here clearly outlines the absorption in truth
and  at  the  same  time  it  outlines  this  also  as  absorption  in  liberty!
Actually  there  is  more  than  this.  Here  truth  and  liberty  are  not  only
devised  as  being  in  some  kind  of  eurhythmic  parallelism;  they  are
presented as being interlaced, interwoven, the one supposing/questioning
the  other,  and/but  at  the  same  time  they  increase  and  complete  one
another.
1 It  has caused by no means as much uproar as for  example the Heideggerian
thought of the aletheia, notion connected also with the issue of truth. 
2 See Plato,  Az állam.  Részletek (The Republic. Excerpts), selected, introduced
and annotated by Sándor Pál, Budapest, Gondolat Publishing House, 1968, pp.
194–198.
Nevertheless, the cave myth – at least seemingly – presents and
narrativizes liberty as a kind of “condition” for truth, more precisely as its
“milieu”.  The  people  chained  since  their  childhood at  first  are  at  the
mercy of those who, using the firelight from behind the scenes, confine
their perception to the illusory truths of the shadow world. On the other
hand (their) liberty – namely (their) liberation from the chains, which is
quite casual and it does not depend on the chained persons themselves or
it  has  an  “educational”  (paideuticos)  aim  –  will  practically  be  an
“appropriate”  milieu  for  truth.  Later  on  the  liberated  individuals
encounter the beings and get  to know them “in” this environment, this
cognitive process being actually orientated toward truth.
At first, of course, the search for truth is not directed towards the
things  themselves,  but  towards  the  light.  In  the  beginning  this  is  the
firelight, then, gradually, it becomes the “true” light, that of the Sun. Only
in sunlight things appear in their truth; all that is truth and true or, on the
contrary, is shadow, illusion and falsehood is compared to it and measured
by it.
True enough, in the myth liberty itself consists at first only in the
possibilities to turn round, to move… This, however, is a decisive bearing
as regards the matter of truth. For this only has made clear that, though in
the cave some things can be regarded as being true without this liberty  –
that means, while being chained –, there is not and there cannot be at all
any actual truth without freedom!
There is not and there cannot be truth exactly because one does
not – cannot – turn round and “move”. That is to say, because there is not
and there cannot be: search for truth!
Here therefore liberty belongs to, or – and this is probably even
more  important  –  is  interweaved  with  truth  in  the  first  place  as  the
possibility and prerequisite of the search for truth. Without coexistence
with  liberty  there  can  be  no  truth  at  all;  may  this  truth  be  defined,
conceived  and  asserted  as  “rightness”,  “appropriateness”  or  even  as
aletheia, as unconcealment.
This therefore means that when we search for truth in a certain
fundamental sense we are already “at” truth. For without this search no
“knowledge”, “truth” etc. can be born, can exist or, if it does exist, it lacks
all sense. But it is also clear that the name of this searchingly existing-in-
truth, being-in-truth is no other than: liberty!
The  “search  for  truth”  –  more  narrowly,  “specifically”  called
“cognition”, or even “investigation”, that is: the search for knowledge – is
not  merely  an  accidental  or  external  prerequisite  of  truth,  but  it  is
precisely its constant source, component and definite coefficient. Without
this probably there is no “truth” at all that can be obtained.
Therefore liberty – as the being-in-truth constituted together with
the  search  for  knowledge  and  truth  –  is  at  the  same  time precisely  a
continuous (internal) “component” of truth as well. On the contrary, for
example the stupidity of “omniscience” consists exactly in the fact that
such a person “could know everything”, however, he could never know
that he “knows” at all. For “to know” one needs exactly to experience the
knowledge of not-knowing that is constituted only during the search of
truth. And this is not characteristic to the “omniscient” person.  For he
necessarily always knows everything  ab ovo… Otherwise he would not
be called “omniscient”. The situation is the same with the immortal too:
such a person “does never die”, but meanwhile he never lives a moment
at all.
Consequently things like “truth” and “liberty” exist only in and
through  the  existence  of  that  finite  –  mortal  –  being,  which,  exactly
because of this, has a relationship full of risks with existence…
Of course, the situation is the same with “falsity”, too. “Falsity”,
untruth also acquires its meaning and its (dangerous) weight only in and
from the being-in-truth constituted in and through the search for  truth.
However, all this indicates that being-in-truth is not simply outlined in the
mere opposition with untruth, but it appears as real being-in-untruth.
But this is far from referring us to some conceptual or other kind
of “dialectic”; it rather sends us to a more profound  openness. Namely,
the openness of search!
The  search  and  the  openness  that  is  constituted  and  outlined
through it and in it – therefore asserted, articulated and never without a
direction  –  give  on  the  one  hand  the  weight  of  liberty  and  its  real
“ontological” dimensions, on the other hand its relevance related to truth.
Of course, this holds good vice versa as well.
Therefore the question arises: is there something like that which
is  usually called  “one’s own truth”,  “self-truth”  or  “truth  according  to
one’s own conviction” etc.? For each of these expressions actually means
that far from asking the question referring to the essence of truth we close
or  suspend  this  same  inquiry!  In  the  same  way  we  would  suspend
communication by using “private languages”. For, when Pilate asks Jesus,
“What is truth?”, in fact he receives no answer because the question has
no “room” or “space”. Not only because the question of “truth” is asked
during the trial of a prisoner, but mainly because the inquiry is made in
the atmosphere of already decided, formed and outlined convictions etc.
In what regards the belief that the so-called “self-truths” are harmless for
one another – this harmlessness also “constituting plurality” –, it would
probably be better to consider that as much as Pilate contributed to Jesus’
death, so much contributed Jesus’ conviction to the destruction of Pilate’s
Roman Empire.1
However, “truth” is not to be found where knowledge, already
formed convictions, “epistemological” evidences or petrified beliefs exist,
but  only  where  and  when  the  question  referring  to/searching  for  the
essence  of  truth  can work  and  is  working.  Consequently  truth  exists
where liberty is working as well; that is, where liberty can be asked and
can happen with regard to (the) truth.
Therefore the question referring to the essence of truth actually is
the question of that liberty with and through which truth exists and works;
that is: through which the question of liberty itself is problematised, more
precisely thematised in its weight related to truth.
In other words: the essence of truth – leading through and back
to the essence of liberty – is in fact the explicit inquiry that constitutes the
essence and structure of liberty itself. How else would/could (the) liberty,
(the) truth and (the meaning of) existence find each other in interrelation?
If,  however,  –  and  how else  could it  possibly be?  –  the  strength  and
weight  of  the  questionable/questioning  interconnected
intercommunication of liberty and truth really penetrates to the point of
the meaning of existence, then probably the problem of truth is bound to
the being too – and not only to the “ideas”, “knowledge” and assertions
“formed  about  it”.  And  bound  it  is  like  that  which  “correctly”  and
“adequately” “corresponds” to it.
3.
The question inquiring after the essence of truth essentially may
not even refer to the quidditas and the qualia-s of truth. Therefore it does
not (merely) ask what the epistemological or pragmatic criteria of truth
consist of or the parameters by which decisions can be made relating to
1 I cannot agree for example with Mihály Vajda who does not place the so-called
“self-truths” into a historical – more precisely existential historical – context and
dimension. For in this context it could become clear that the “truths” which have
not been or allegedly cannot be converted into doctrines – like the teaching of
Jesus – how easily “acquire” their dogmas, and that they do not function merely
as a (private) “way of life” in these cases. See:  Mihály Vajda,  Igazság és/vagy
szabadság (Truth and/or Liberty) in idem. Nem az örökkévalóságnak – Filozófiai
(láb)jegyzetek [Not for the Eternity – Philosophical (Foot)Notes] Budapest, Osiris,
1996, pp. 78–83.
truth.  For  all  these  questions  are  –  essentially  –  “secondary”  for  the
inquiry referring  to  the essence  of truth.  That  is,  they are ab ovo and
“implicitly” standing in the – always historical! – questionability or in the
process of decision making that concerns the essence of truth.
It  is  another  matter  whether  their  inquiry  of  all  times  knows
about  this  standing-in  and  takes  this  into  consideration  or,  whether  it
really  and  explicitly  questions  it...  For  example  the  “almost  three
thousand years  old”  truth  of  the  Pythagorean  theorem,  that  can  easily
seem  “eternal”, consists of the fact that its validity has been confirmed
and outlined anew since then by repeated questioning.   The situation is
the same in the case of Euclidean geometry as well...
The  “permanence”  or  “definiteness”  of  truth  consists  only  of
this.  The truth of the so called “analytical  truths” or tautologies  too is
revalidated  only by the history of  successive  generations  of  finite  and
mortal  “rational  beings”  without which validation they would have no
sense at all. For mathematics, physics or formal logic cannot be imagined
without the history of the successive lives of mathematicians, physicians
and logicians as well as their mutually inspiring works that re-question
one another and offer new proofs.1
This  means that  truth actually  is  and  happens only when and
where the question referring to the essence of truth opens up and is kept
open as well – at least according to possibility and horizon – in an explicit
questioning.
The question opening to the essence of truth has another name as
well: liberty! For neither “truth”, nor “liberty” are some kind of “notions”
waiting and longing yet  for their “perfect” definition. On the contrary,
they are questions and problems that instead of being defined must/should
rather always be asked – in a way that the question referring to the one
may open up to the other as well.
4.
Three years after the publication of Being and Time, in 1930, in a
lecture entitled On the Essence of Truth – considered a turning point in his
1 This is the actual ontological relevance of the probably right assertion – which
can  be  considered  a  descriptive  assertion  –  that  the  immediate  essence  of
communicating/transmitting  scientific  truths  (this  may  also  be  called  the
pedagogy of scientific truths) consists in  demonstration. That is: each and every
scientific truth is questioned and – if it seems valid  once more! – proved  anew
each time when communicated. It is essential that more is “handed over” on these
occasions  than  the  “additional”  knowledge  or  “information”  surrounding  the
formal or objective content or the “demonstrations” of the theorems, formulas etc.
oeuvre  –  Heidegger  re-examines  the  problem of  liberty.  Here  thought
strives  towards  the  essence  of  truth.  On  this  road  –  probably  not
accidentally at all – it encounters liberty.
Of course, it is not unusual to seek the essence of truth in liberty.
But this is so not only “from the point of view” of truth, but that of liberty
as well. Thus it becomes clear  ab ovo and again that liberty is not just
some “state” that is given to us or not (and if it is given, then obviously it
is constantly “limited” etc.). Liberty actually has an existential character,
it is characteristic to one’s existence.
Having a  relation-like  attitude towards the being supposes that
one should be situated in the openness. This is the basis of all assertions
related  to  which  the  “epistemological”  problem  of  “rightness”  –  of
“truth”,  “falsity”–  afterwards  constantly  occurs.  But  even  the  possible
“rightness”  and  “wrongness”  of  the  assertions  originates  from  that
openness in which the assertion can be brought at all to its right “state”,
“form”.  The  rightness  thus  achieved  is  built  on  the  possibility  and
accomplishing of those corrections that can only be made on the basis of
openness, respectively as openness.
Therefore,  we must  be open  ab ovo to  the  urgings  of  such  a
correction,  for  only  thus  the  question  of  “rightness”  or  “wrongness”,
occurring related to the assertions, may have some consequence at all…1
In other words: liberty here (as well) will become the essence of
truth  as something that actually is the basis, source, exponent, coefficient
of  the  “interior”  possibility  of  truth.2 We  are  able  to  form  correct
judgements  –  more  precisely  to  form  “judgements”  at  all  –,  only  if
meanwhile  we are  and remain  free to  let  that  something to  be and  to
manifest itself “as something”. And if, related to all these, we reckon with
the  possibility  of  being  right  or  wrong  –  continually  correcting
“ourselves” too – in a way that suits the weight of the question being at
stake.
Therefore truth and liberty refer to one another, but they do this
in a basic sense and way which already urges  the modification of  the
essence of both truth and liberty. Liberty is revealed to be “letting-be”
(Sein-lassen), letting the being to – possibly – reveal itself in the openness
in its unconcealment as a – possible – self-self.
1 With reference to this see also the paper entitled Állítás (asszerció), kérdezés és
tagadás (Assertion, Questioning and Denial) from the volume  István Király V.,
Kérdő jelezés [Question(ing) Mark(ing)], Bratislava, Kalligram, 2004.
2 See:  Martin  Heidegger,  Az igazság  lényegéről, in  idem., Útjelzők,  Budapest,
Osiris, 2003, pp. 173 –193.
Truth will become  aletheia (unconcealment),  while liberty will
be a letting-be openness to existence which exists while it lets be, which
depends on possibilities and is divided in these – and it is not some kind
of “characteristic” or “state”.
“To  be  free”  therefore  means  to  be  open  to  the
manifestation/appearance  of  unconcealment  and  to  the  quite  self-
concealing guidance of this, while one is in the problematic and weighty
concealment.  Consequently,  it  means  that  one  must  be  open  to  one’s
endeavour to let-oneself-be!
Therefore and repeatedly:  liberty is  not some characteristic  of
humans, on the contrary, – if we need to think here in property relations –
actually the human being is the one “owned” by liberty.1
5.
In  this  way, of  course,  truth transcends  that,  which is usually
regarded  the  subject  and  domain  of  epistemology  and  logic  as
“cognition”,  respectively  “science”.  For  thus  one  can  realise  that  for
example works of art or more generally art have their own truth. And this
is not an indifferent or secondary truth at all.
For how could we people actually face for example such things
like the truth “related to” ungratefulness or avarice, if not by the means of
Shakespeare’s Iago or Balzac’s Gobseck? And in what “judgements” or
“assertions” “is placed” the truth of these works of art?
Truth,  however,  can  only  transcend  the  narrower  and  more
“special”  existentiality  of  “cognition”  –  meant  as  studying  and
specifically  outlined – in  an  existentially  and horizon-like way. It  can
obtain a world-like importance, only if it exists and happens always in a
common essentiality with liberty.
However, what differentiates to some extent typically the various
– scientific or literary-artistic etc. – “texts” is that they exist within the
language.  The  language  essential  to  these  texts  has  an  ontological
character,  belongs  to  the  historical  world  and  is  well  articulated.  This
manifests itself while one is “merely reading” the texts.
The  language  of  the  literary  work  of  art  is  specific  and  of
distinguished  importance  because  “the  poetical  evocative  power  of
language created by sound as well as meaning is intimately interwoven”. 2
1 Ibid.
2 See: István Fehér M., József Attila esztétikai írásai és Gadamer hermeneutikája
– Irodalmi szöveg és filozófiai szöveg (Attila József’s Writings in Aesthetics and
Gadamer’s  Hermeneutics  –  Literary  Text  and  Philosophical  Text),  Bratislava,
This interconnectedness cannot be superseded and is ever valid. In this
respect literary texts are “eminent” texts for Gadamer too.
Contrary  to  this,  for  example  philosophical  texts  are
characterised by a certain “intermediarity”. For these essentially “operate”
with  notions.  Because this they cannot achieve the unity of sound and
meaning characteristic  to the work of art.  However, they are bound to
language as well – this being a constantly essential aspect for them. This
is why the “eminence” of the relationship between philosophical  texts,
respectively philosophy and language consists in the fact that their words
and texts perpetually surpass, transcend themselves.
Because of this, philosophers actually – or: consequently – have
no “texts” at all. And even if there are such things, they essentially are the
soul’s continuous historical conversation with itself that cannot be ended
– thus “progressing towards infinity”. (As conversation, philosophy is –
from a  different  direction,  but  –  as  “near”  to  the  essence/existence  of
language,  connected  to  existence  in  general,  as  poetry,  which,  beyond
having a certain meaning, is identical with that which it means…)
According to this, poetry is not conversation, or it is – would be
– that, which in the final,  completed work is only the – one – end of
conversation. Indeed, philosophy could not survive if it were like this…
In a well defined and historically divided western tradition all
this appears  as a kind of miserable “imperfection” of philosophy. This
does  not  merely  –  and  in  the  first  place  –  mean  that  words  become
degraded and worn out during their theoretical “use”,  but that they are
“imperfect”  from the  beginning.  This  is  because  they  are  merely  and
excessively: human words.
Contrary to this – according to Gadamer’s hermeneutics – the
“divine” word is perfect; because it is “one alone”. Obviously, in the case
of poetic word “perfect” has a different meaning, namely: its formulation
is final. A poem simply cannot be written “with other words”…
According to me, this means that, related to the formulation of
poetic words, all “understanding by itself” is impossible. That is, poetry,
maybe in contrast with other texts, always and ab ovo – and not only as
the  consequence  of  temporal  distances  etc.  –  claims  the  efforts  of  a
hermeneutical  interpretation;  it  demands  application,  the  self-changing
challenges of making the text one’s own.
As Heidegger puts it, poetry always and essentially urges us to
dialogue by this. To a dialogue in which precisely the conversation of
Kalligram, 2003, pp. 164, 166.
poets and thinkers may prove the most important and the most existence-
like from the perspective of the subject, language, conversation and its
importance…
But  in  what  else  does  the  significance of  poetry’s  perfection
consist, if not in the fact that it orientates man – as a contrast – towards
(his) language as a constantly emerging want of language and existence?
Therefore  it  can  be  asked,  whether  philosophy has  really  some other
“task”, related to which we could regretfully state, that it has no adequate,
specific language of its own…1
Contrary to this, divine word, is “one alone”, as we have seen it.
This does not mean that there is only “one piece” of it, for God talks quite
a lot in the Bible. It would/could rather mean that this word contains the
“whole thing” at once and as a whole. Compared to this, of course, human
word  is  “imperfect”.  That  is,  it  is  dependent  on  logic,  grammar,
etymology, language theory etc. and even hermeneutics… In other words:
divine  word  may  be  considered  a  word  that  has  no  language  at  all,
respectively it has no need of such a thing – at  least it  seems so. The
special  problem,  however,  is  in  this  case  as  well  that  this  word  is
addressed to man, who, on the other hand, has to struggle continuously
with the multitude of words and their meanings in his language/languages
– if only because the disposition made at Babel.
Consequently:  “even  being dependent upon conversation is the
sign of imperfection and finitude.”2 This, naturally, cannot happen with
God… Gods  –  besides  many other  things  – do not  philosophize,  but,
maybe, they only present man with philosophy; and – at least according to
Aristotle – this is their most important (good) deed.
According to this, however, there would be no sound reason for
us to complain that we are constrained to practice philosophy, or even
hermeneutics etc. For: only because divine word is without language, and
poetical  language  is  definitive,  a  challenging  and  even  unavoidable
opportunity presents itself, an opportunity to “elaborate theories”… and
of  course  to  practice  philosophy/hermeneutics  as  well.  For  only these
have  to/are  able  to  undo  themselves  and  transcend  themselves
continuously – in dialogue –, while moving in the directions of truth and
liberty,  which  are  always  and  historically  opened  or  opening  to
possibilities (and always dangerous).
6.
1 Cf. ibid. p. 181.
2 Ibid. p. 183.
But even (natural-)scientific  discovery  will be pointless within
the  historical  and  linguistic  situation  outlined  above  unless  “it
subordinates  itself  to  the  hints  of  this  situation  and  answers  these  by
interpreting the conjectures formulated in them.”1 So it becomes more and
more clear that – in relation to natural sciences – the “place” of truth is
not  in  assertion  or  verification,  but  rather  in  the  real,  living scientific
discovery itself.2 And  this  has  not,  after  all,  psychological,
“epistemological”  or  “epistemological-methodological”  character,
respectively importance, but ontological one.
This  is  why  we  should  here  mention  that  nowadays  the
“hermeneutics  of  natural  sciences”  is  being  outlined  once  again,  a
hermeneutics that efficiently reaches back to the Diltheyian, Husserlian
and most importantly to the Heideggerian tradition. The philosophical-
hermeneutical  value  of  such  efforts  cannot  be  overrated.  For  –  either
admittedly or unadmittedly – they tend to  make acknowledged and to
undertake the otherwise elementary fact that natural sciences are probably
“cultivated” by the same Being-here (Dasein) – as its own and not at all
secondary or indifferent way of existence –, which operates in the case of
“spiritual sciences”, religions/theologies listening to divine words or all
the arts and technical or political “professions”; and, of course, in the case
of philosophy.
Therefore,  as  long  as  we  “hermeneutically”  or
“phenomenologically” distinguish “the thing itself” according to the ways
by which it manifests itself, is made accessible – that is, according to the
“methods  of  the  exact  natural  sciences”,  the  “methods  of  spiritual
sciences”  etc.  –  (though  many  of  these  aspects  are  acceptable  and
important),  we actually neglect  the “more essential” aspect  that  for us
“things” can only appear – as meanings – together with the risks of their
manifestation…  And  this,  of  course,  is  valid  in  the  case  of  natural
sciences,  as well  as it  is  related to the other  ways  of  existence of the
Dasein,  which  are  always  specifically  divided.  Moreover,  it  is  their
essential,  fundamental  aspect –  which,  however,  was  hardly  made
explicit.
1 Theodore  J.  Kisiel,  A  természettudományos  felfedezés  hermeneutikája (The
Hermeneutics of the Natural-Scientific Discovery), in Tibor Schwendtner, László
Roppolyi  and  Olga  Kiss  (eds.), Hermeneutika  és  a  természettudományok
(Hermeneutics and Natural Sciencies), Budapest, Áron Publishing House, 2001, p.
102.
2 Ibid. p. 91.
Therefore it is totally wrong to consider Heidegger’s “critique of
– natural  and social  –  science”  as  referring  merely to science.  On the
contrary: his critique of science – leading to the critique of “metaphysics”
and more generally to the critique of “philosophy”– actually widens and
deepens to a polemos of existential history. In other words: it becomes the
– in its essence entirely factic – critique and actual challenge of the “fate”
of existential history…
Since, for example: “Mathematics is a human science as well as
other sciences… and we need to count only because we are temporally
finite  beings.”1 Consequently,  not  even  Heidegger’s  reflections  aim  to
simply undo or suspend for example all the results/convictions related to
the “criteria” of truth; and still less to give new “criteria” to science.
Heidegger only reflects  on the essence of truth and in this he
loosens  up/liberates  or  re-questions  all  former  cogitation  about  the
essence  of  truth.  He  does  not  say  that  science  does  its  job  wrongly,
respectively,  that  it  forms  wrong  statements  and  propositions  about
wrongly presented facts. He only asks questions referring to the sense that
determines  the  place,  “role”  and  perspectives  of  science  in  existential
history. And he asks, of course, whether these questions can be answered
or not “within” the confines of science itself.
For,  when  we  ask  these  questions,  it  is  revealed  that  the
“correctness” of assertions – including scientific assertions as well – is
made  possible  only  by  the  openness  of  the  relation  constituted,
respectively  divided  by  these  questions,  more  precisely  by  the
investigation itself, “and that, which makes this correctness possible, can
claim the essence of truth by a more genuine right.”2
Although hereby the idea, that assertion is the only or the true,
the essential “place” of truth, proves to be false, this does not mean that,
in this way, assertions are ab ovo “untrue”, or that some truth or even the
essence of truth does not abide in them as in “places”… It means that “all
this”  “is  within  the  assertion”,  but  truth/the  essence  of  truth  is  not
confined  only  to  this.  Meanwhile  the  assertion  itself,  respectively  the
possibility  of  its  correspondence  to  “objects”  is  actually  based  on  the
openness  of  the attitude  divided  precisely  by  the  assertion  itself.  This
openness of attitude, after all, proves to be exactly (the) liberty.
1 See:  Oskar Becker,  Măreţia şi limitele gîndirii matematice (The Greatness and
the Limits  of Mathematical  Thinking),  Bucharest,  Scientific  Publishing House,
1968, pp. 168–169. 
2 Martin Heidegger,  Az igazság lényegéről (On the Essence of Truth), p. 179.
Therefore, if we say that the essence of truth is liberty – and here
“essence” probably is not understood as a “pure” generality distilled to a
flavourless, colourless, odourless state – this means exactly the opening
up of the questioning investigation and the questioning and questionable
relation in the openness – as the actual and real existential history of the
dependence-on-existence brought into Being-here.
Moreover,  indeed:  “Whatever  happens  with  historical  human
beings comes in each case from a decision about the essence of truth that
happened long ago and is never up to humans alone.”1 
1 Martin  Heidegger,  Platón tanítása  az  igazság  lényegéről (Plato’ Doctrine of
Truth), p. 224.
